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  1819 
SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES AND VULTURE 
HEDGE FUNDS: ISSUES AND POLICY 
SOLUTIONS 
Abstract: Since the 1990s, “vulture” hedge funds have made fabulous returns by 
pursuing a controversial strategy: buying bonds issued by countries in or near de-
fault and then suing those countries for full repayment. Vulture funds’ invest-
ments have resulted in chaotic, drawn-out default episodes and an enormous re-
distribution of wealth from developing countries to billionaire investors. Despite 
the real benefits vultures provide to the secondary market for sovereign debt, 
something must be done to dull their talons. Lamentably, however, no viable so-
lution currently exists. This Note argues that a nonprofit fund designed to com-
pete with vultures could at least mitigate harm to developing nations during the 
next wave of defaults. 
INTRODUCTION 
At current interest rates, savings account holders will enjoy a thirty per-
cent return on their initial deposit after fifteen years.1 More adventurous inves-
tors who wade into the stock market can expect a handsome return of more 
than one hundred percent over that same period.2 And for those intrepid souls 
who choose to litigate bond claims against poor, overly indebted sovereign 
nations, the rewards can be much, much richer.3 
Take the hedge fund Elliott Capital (Elliott), which began buying Argen-
tinian bonds in 2001.4 Argentina’s financial distress enabled Elliott to scoop 
these bonds up for pennies on the dollar.5 Elliott then pursued full repayment 
                                                                                                                           
 1 9 Best Savings Accounts of April 2020, NERDWALLET, https://www.nerdwallet.com/banking/
best-savings-accounts [https://perma.cc/LX33-S92H]. The calculation above is based on a 1.7% inter-
est rate compounding over fifteen years. Id.; see Compound Interest Calculator, MONEYCHIMP, http://
www.moneychimp.com/calculator/compound_interest_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/8MQV-A6G4] 
(calculating total return assuming one initial contribution and no withdrawals). 
 2 See Roger Wohlner, Average Stock Market Return, WEALTHSIMPLE (Nov. 20, 2019), https://
www.wealthsimple.com/en-us/learn/average-stock-market-return [https://perma.cc/Z5C2-9H9H] (cal-
culating that the average annual return of the Dow Jones Industrial Index from 1897 to 2018 was 
5.42%). A one-thousand-dollar investment returning 5.42% annually will grow to $2,208 in fifteen 
years. Compound Interest Calculator, supra note 1. 
 3 Renae Merle, How One Hedge Fund Made $2 Billion from Argentina’s Economic Collapse, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/03/29/how-
one-hedge-fund-made-2-billion-from-argentinas-economic-collapse/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.
2374ebc896ec [https://perma.cc/ML8P-UJ7G]. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. Elliott’s final position, for which it paid $117 million, had a face value of over five times 
that amount. Id. 
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of the debt relentlessly, to the point where the fund convinced a court in Ghana 
to seize an Argentinian warship used to train naval cadets.6 When Argentina 
finally agreed to settle for $2.4 billion in 2016, a year in which over twenty 
percent of Argentines lived in poverty, Elliott pocketed returns of over two-
thousand percent.7 
As one might expect, “vultures” like Elliott Capital do not enjoy popular 
support, despite providing a check on excessive sovereign borrowing as well 
as much-needed liquidity and information to the secondary market.8 On the 
other hand, vultures’ activity can hinder efficient sovereign restructuring, lead-
ing to prolonged periods of economic misery.9 Still, since vultures began to 
circle in the 1990s, the international community has failed to find a way to 
capture their benefits while reining in their excesses.10 
Sovereign debt levels have risen sharply in the decade following the 
Great Recession.11 Debt issued by default-prone “frontier markets,” or those 
that investors deem even riskier than emerging markets, recently surpassed its 
pre-financial crisis high.12 Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic has tipped 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story of How a Hedge Fund Detained a Vessel in Ghana and 
Even Went for Argentina’s Air Force One, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the-real-story-behind-the-argentine-vessel-in-ghana-and-how-hedge-funds-
tried-to-seize-the-presidential-plane/#422e59fc25aa [https://perma.cc/5JSL-FNEF]. 
 7 Luca Di Fabio, Economic Development in Argentina and Its Effect on Poverty, BORGEN PRO-
JECT (May 17, 2018), https://borgenproject.org/economic-development-in-argentina-and-its-effect-on-
poverty [https://perma.cc/KL3E-6SJM]; Merle, supra note 3. By contrast, buy-and-hold stock market 
investors would need to wait about 173 years to approach Elliott’s gains. See Compound Interest Cal-
culator, supra note 1. Elliot’s aggression led Argentinian President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner to 
label it and similar hedge funds “vultures” at a speech delivered to the United Nations (U.N.) General 
Assembly. Hugh Bronstein, Argentina Calls Holdout Funds ‘Terrorists,’ Says Germany ‘Hostile,’ 
REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-debt/argentina-calls-holdout-
funds-terrorists-says-germany-hostile-idUSKCN0HJ1TM20140924 [https://perma.cc/GLQ6-QUGU]. 
 8 See, e.g., David Dayen, How Hedge Funds Are Pillaging Puerto Rico, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 11, 
2015), https://prospect.org/article/how-hedge-funds-are-pillaging-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/RV99-
GCET] (noting that the Obama administration characterized Puerto Rico’s battle with creditors as a 
“humanitarian crisis”). 
 9 See Merle, supra note 3 (describing Argentina’s nearly two-decade long battle with vulture 
creditors). 
 10 See A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 
EMORY L.J. 997, 998 (2004) (noting that despite several attempts in the twentieth century, the interna-
tional community has failed to establish a sovereign bankruptcy program). 
 11 See Marc Jones, Government Debt Levels to Hit New Global High This Year—S&P, REUTERS 
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/governments-debt-sp/government-debt-levels-to-hit-
new-global-high-this-year-sp-idUSL8N1QC70R [https://perma.cc/7T7K-NBGD] (reporting that sov-
ereign international debt had reached a record high for the third consecutive year). 
 12 Steve Johnson, Frontier Market at 15-Year High, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.ft.
com/content/106ff44a-402a-11e9-9bee-efab61506f44 [https://perma.cc/E4VQ-5EN7]. Debt owed by 
frontier markets, such as Pakistan, Nigeria, and Argentina, has increased by nearly thirty times since 
2009. Id. 
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the global economy into recession.13 Developing nations are in a precarious 
position, and cash-rich vultures will begin to circle overhead.14 The need for an 
effective policy solution is urgent.15 
Regrettably, however, the international community has failed to produce 
one.16 Innovations in bond-drafting practices will not take effect for decades, 
and markets have been disappointingly slow to adopt them.17 Calls for an in-
ternational bankruptcy regime have failed to gain traction.18 And anti-vulture 
fund legislation, which just a handful of nations have adopted, has the unfortu-
nate effect of neutralizing the benefits that vultures provide.19 
To avoid economic and humanitarian catastrophe in the wake of an immi-
nent wave of sovereign default, developed nations must confront vultures head 
on.20 The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) are already ma-
jor direct creditors to the developing world.21 The time has come for these in-
                                                                                                                           
 13 Chris Isidore, Coronavirus Has Plunged the World into a Recession, According to S&P, CNN 
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/17/economy/global-recession/index.html [https://
perma.cc/B2CA-7R6K]. In addition to a mere “garden-variety recession,” markets are grappling with the 
possibility of “several quarters of declining economic activity, a credit crisis or even a depression.” Lewis 
Krauskopf, ‘D’ Word Rears Head as Coronavirus-Hit Markets Brace for Recession, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 
2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-stocks-economy-usa/d-word-rears-head-as-
coronavirus-hit-markets-brace-for-recession-idUSKBN2140IA [https://perma.cc/ZP97-ABEN]. 
 14 Klaus Willie et al., Distressed-Debt Funds Take Breather Waiting for Next Crisis, BLOOM-
BERG (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-30/distressed-debt-funds-
take-a-breather-waiting-for-next-crisis [https://perma.cc/AW4R-UKVM]. According to one hedge 
fund manager, “next year is going to be good for distressed debt in emerging markets and Europe.” Id. 
That next crisis has arrived: “the recent implosion in global financial markets . . . sparked by the coro-
navirus outbreak” has brought emerging market debt “closer to ‘vulture’ territory.” Agustino Fon-
tevecchia, Argentine Bonds Slide Toward ‘Vulture’ Territory, FORBES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2020/03/17/argentine-bonds-slide-toward-vulture-territory/#16d276d
f114a [https://perma.cc/25YY-NFKB]. 
 15 See Jones, supra note 11 (reporting that global sovereign debt levels reached an all-time high in 
2018). 
 16 See Dickerson, supra note 10, at 998 (bemoaning the lack of an international bankruptcy sys-
tem after several failed attempts to establish one). 
 17 See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 299, 319–21 (2005) (discussing the market’s reluctance to deviate from boilerplate language 
in sovereign bonds). 
 18 Dickerson, supra note 10, at 998. 
 19 Id.; see Lucas Wozny, Note, National Anti-Vulture Funds Legislation: Belgium’s Turn, 2017 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 697, 712–14 (describing the negative impact of anti-vulture legislation on the 
secondary market for distressed sovereign debt). 
 20 See Dayen, supra note 8 (detailing the dire economic and humanitarian situation in Puerto Rico 
in throes of its debt crisis). 
 21 See IMF Conditionality, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.imf.org/en/
About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/02/21/28/IMF-Conditionality [https://perma.cc/9HYS-PM74] (de-
scribing the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) lending to credit-strapped nations); What Is IDA?, 
INT’L DEV. ASS’N, http://ida.worldbank.org/about/what-is-ida [https://perma.cc/F7UK-QV2H] (noting 
that IDA is “one of the largest sources of assistance for the world’s poorest 76 countries” that “pro-
vides grants to countries at risk of debt distress”). 
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stitutions to enter the secondary market and begin buying distressed sovereign 
debt.22 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of sovereign debt crises, describing 
their history, causes, and consequences.23 Part I then examines the vulture hedge 
funds and their role in sovereign debt restructuring.24 Part II discusses various 
policies designed to mitigate the damage done by vultures in sovereign default 
scenarios.25 Part III argues that none of those proposals is adequate to both ad-
dress the problems caused by holdout litigation and preserve the benefits that 
vulture funds provide.26 Part III then recommends a novel, market-based ap-
proach under which institutional lenders form funds to compete with vultures.27 
I. SOVEREIGN DEBT AND VULTURE FUNDS 
Section A of this Part reviews the mechanics of sovereign default, includ-
ing its causes and consequences.28 It then provides a brief historical overview 
of sovereign default, culminating in the sovereign default landscape of today.29 
Section B covers vulture funds that invest in the distressed debt securities of 
struggling companies and nation-states.30 The discussion includes the history 
and development of vulture funds, their methods, and the impact of their activ-
ities in the sovereign debt market.31 
A. Sovereign Debt Crises 
Sovereign nations finance their activities by issuing fixed-income debt 
securities that pay regular interest payments and return the investor’s initial 
investment upon maturity.32 Episodes of sovereign default—when debtor na-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 285–316 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 32–113 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 114–171 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 172–284 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 285–297 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 298–316 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 32–72 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 73–113 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 114–171 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 114–171 and accompanying text. 
 32 Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 65 (2010); Stephen Kim Park & Tim R Samples, Towards Sovereign Equity, 
21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 240, 242 (2016). Government budget deficits and debt loads have bal-
looned in the twenty-first century. Rich Miller, U.S. Budget Deficit, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/deficit-disconnect [https://perma.cc/FW4R-73VX]. In the 
United States, for example, both reached record highs in 2018—the deficit hit nearly eight hundred 
billion dollars and the national debt reached nearly twenty-two trillion dollars. Lydia DePillis, US 
National Debt Rises $2 Trillion Under Trump, CNN (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/03/
politics/trump-us-national-debt/index.html [https://perma.cc/MX94-6MHH]; Miller, supra. The U.S. 
government’s response to the coronavirus outbreak will only add to these numbers. Jon Hilsenrath, 
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tions fail to make payments according to the terms of debt contracts—have 
occurred regularly throughout history.33 The following Section covers the cir-
cumstances surrounding sovereign default, the history of such defaults, and 
issues presented by the current sovereign restructuring framework.34 
1. Causes and Effects 
Researchers have identified a number of interrelated economic and politi-
cal risk factors that may contribute to sovereign default.35 Perhaps the simplest 
explanation for why sovereign governments default is economic malaise.36 
Sixty-two percent of sovereign defaults since the year 1800 have coincided 
with a sharp decline in economic output, and in severe downturns, the proba-
bility of sovereign defaults doubles.37 The story is not so simple, however, as 
struggling countries have often avoided default whereas flourishing ones have 
not.38 
Other factors may include the cost of borrowing, swings in trade balanc-
es, currency devaluation, banking crises, and political tumult.39 Since the latter 
half of the twentieth century, U.S. monetary policy has largely determined the 
borrowing costs of developing nations.40 As U.S. interest rates rise, so too do 
                                                                                                                           
Coronavirus Pandemic to Test Limits of How Much Debt U.S. Can Bear, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-deficit-set-to-soar-as-government-responds-to-coronavirus-
11584568685 [https://perma.cc/H2HR-V5PP] (projecting record-high deficit levels following the 
outbreak). 
 33 See Ricardo Correa & Horacio Sapriza, Sovereign Debt Crises 3, 5 (Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1104, 2014), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2014/1104/ifdp1104.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPS4-2ETC] (describing the me-
chanics of sovereign default episodes and noting that they have been “recurrent events” throughout 
history). Sovereigns need not repudiate debt entirely to default. Id. at 5. Also, credit rating agencies 
consider any debt renegotiation that eases a sovereign’s debt burden to be a technical default episode. 
Id. 
 34 See infra notes 35–171 and accompanying text. 
 35 See Correa & Sapriza, supra note 33, at 6–7 (discussing the myriad causes of sovereign de-
fault). 
 36 Michael Tomz & Mark Wright, Do Countries Default in “Bad Times”?, 5 J. EUR. ECON. 
ASS’N 352, 352–54 (2007). 
 37 Id. at 355–56. “Severe” downturns are those where economic activity contracts by more than 
seven percent below long-term trend growth. Id. at 355. 
 38 Id. at 353. Contrary to what an armchair economist might expect, an empirical study conducted 
by Michael Tomz and Mark Wright detected a “surprisingly weak” relationship between reduced 
output and default. Id. The picture is probably more complex; a complete account of default likely 
requires greater detail on the performance of individual sectors of the sovereign’s economy, the sover-
eign’s economic performance relative to that of other nations, and the interplay between economic and 
political factors. Id. at 358–59. 
 39 Correa & Sapriza, supra note 33, at 6–7. These factors may operate independently or in tandem 
to create a negative “feedback loop.” Id. at 4. 
 40 Vivek B. Arora & Martin Cerisola, How Does U.S. Monetary Policy Influence Sovereign 
Spreads in Emerging Markets?, 48 IMF STAFF PAPERS 474, 490, 493 (2001). 
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spreads between developing nations’ sovereign debt and U.S. treasuries.41 The 
increased borrowing cost thus elevates default risk for sovereigns with vulner-
able economies.42 
Emerging economies are also particularly sensitive to “terms of trade” 
shocks, which are changes in the ratio of their export prices to import prices.43 
Trade shocks are especially devastating for economies whose health is overly 
dependent on the exportation of a small number of commodities.44 
Swings in the value of local currency also present risk of default.45 The 
risk is particularly acute where the sovereign must make debt service payments 
in another currency such as U.S. dollars.46 Devaluation of the local currency 
can make such payments more burdensome.47 
Banking crises can also precipitate sovereign defaults, typically through 
one of two avenues: government involvement in the financial sector and the 
economic ramifications of weakened banks.48 Default risk increases where 
governments act as a backstop to struggling banks by guaranteeing their debts 
or bailing them out of insolvency.49 Banking crises can also result in currency 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 475. 
 42 Id.; Justin Lahart, The Fed Won’t Save Emerging Markets, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fed-wont-save-emerging-markets-1536859244 [https://perma.cc/
R3BM-FCUQ]. In the future, the Federal Reserve’s fiscal tightening and interest rate normalization 
campaigns may ultimately result in default for several struggling emerging economies. See Lahart, 
supra (discussing the Fed’s 2018 plan to raise interest rates and its probable effects on emerging mar-
kets). 
 43 Christian Broda, Terms of Trade and Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries, 63 J. 
INT’L ECON. 31, 32 (2002); Enrique Mendoza, The Terms of Trade, the Real Exchange Rate, and 
Economic Fluctuations, 36 INT’L ECON. REV. 101, 134 (1995). 
 44 Gabriel Cuadra & Horacio Sapriza, Sovereign Default, Terms of Trade and Interest Rates in 
Emerging Markets 1 (Banco de México, Working Paper No. 2006-01, 2006), https://www.banxico.
org.mx/publications-and-press/banco-de-mexico-working-papers/%7B2426947A-D772-E109-C1D1-
722EB39B6BAC%7D.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7FD-QZLK]. For example, oil constitutes ninety six 
percent of Venezuela’s total exports. Venezuela Exports, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.
com/venezuela/exports [https://perma.cc/HQ26-763S]. Not coincidentally, Venezuela has the dubious 
honor of most defaults—ten—since 1800. Usual Suspects, THE ECONOMIST (July 31, 2014), https://
www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2014/07/31/usual-suspects [https://perma.cc/KP9F-X5J5]. Ecua-
dor is currently tied for the lead. Id. 
 45 Correa & Sapriza, supra note 33, at 7. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis, 101 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1676, 1701 (2011); Correa & Sapriza, supra note 33, at 8. In some cases, sovereign debt 
issues can precede bank crises; in practice, it is difficult to determine the direction of causation. Rein-
hart & Rogoff, supra, at 1698. 
 49 Correa & Sapriza, supra note 33, at 9–10. Because they create uncertainty and drive sovereigns 
deeper into debt, bailouts increase sovereign borrowing costs, and rising bond yields reduce the prices 
of outstanding sovereign debt, of which domestic banks tend to hold a large portion. See id. (noting 
that a “bailout of the banking sector lowers government debt prices, and further deterioration of the 
balance sheets of those banks holding public debt” can lead a country to default); see also Eduardo 
Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default 4, 17 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
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panics or induce economic downturns.50 A floundering financial sector can 
staunch the flow of credit through an economy, creating a domino effect of 
higher borrowing costs, reduced economic activity, lower tax receipts, and in-
creased public sector spending.51 
Finally, political events may also play a role.52 Shifts in leadership can re-
sult in policy changes, reduced confidence, and elevated borrowing costs, 
thereby increasing default risk.53 
The consequences of sovereign defaults can be severe, although empirical 
evidence suggests that they do not last long.54 First, defaults are accompanied 
by a decrease in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of between 0.5% and 2%, 
with an average of 1.2% per year spent in default.55 Default may also negative-
ly affect a debtor sovereign’s standing in the community of nations.56 Reputa-
tional costs can impair a debtor nation’s ability to access capital markets, or at 
the very least raise that nation’s cost of borrowing temporarily.57 
In addition, default can result in exclusion from international trade.58 
Such exclusion may take the form of official trade sanctions like embargoes or 
may occur as a result of increased credit costs for firms in the debtor nation.59 
Additionally, because sovereign debt is often held by residents of the issuing 
nation, default can impose costs to the domestic economy through the financial 
system.60 In particular, local banks that hold sovereign debt experience heavy 
                                                                                                                           
Paper No. 08/238, 2008), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08238.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZV8B-MP6Q] (noting that “domestic residents tend to account for a sizeable portion of the hold-
ings, perhaps a majority” of sovereign debt). Bailouts may therefore have the unintended effect of 
further weakening wobbly banks’ balance sheets and prolonging crises. Borensztein & Panizza, supra, 
at 18. 
 50 Correa & Sapriza, supra note 33, at 8. 
 51 Id. at 8–10. 
 52 Id.; see also Juan Carlos Hatchondo et al., Heterogeneous Borrowers in Quantitative Models of 
Sovereign Default 2–4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No. 07–01R, 2007), https://
www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/working_papers/2007/pdf/
wp07-1r.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WCN-W6WY] (using a predictive model to determine the impact of 
political change on sovereign default risk). 
 53 See Hatchondo et al., supra note 52, at 2 (analyzing the effects of regime change on sovereign 
bond prices in Brazil and Ecuador). 
 54 Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 49, at 22. Empirical studies have not shown detrimental 
economic effects more than two years post-default. Id. at 23. Indeed, even serial defaulters seem to 
enjoy relatively unfettered access to international capital. Carmen M. Reinhart et al., Debt Intolerance, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 1, 2003, at 4. Creditor- or debtor-imposed limits on 
borrowing by default-prone sovereigns may help to break the painful cycle of default. Id. at 5. 
 55 Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 49, at 8. 
 56 Id. at 14. 
 57 Id. “Reputation of sovereign borrowers that fall in default, as measured by credit ratings and 
spreads, is tainted but only for a short time.” Id. at 22. 
 58 See id. at 14–16 (discussing research that shows “a decline in bilateral trade” following de-
fault). 
 59 Id. at 15. 
 60 Id. at 17–19. 
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losses as a result of default, which may impact their willingness or ability to 
lend.61 The downstream effects of restricted lending can be severe.62 
Finally, default often comes at a cost to political leaders, including risk of 
unpopularity or even ouster.63 The historical record suggests that chief execu-
tives of defaulting democratic governments face a fifty percent chance of re-
moval from office following default.64 Defaulting dictatorships, on the other 
hand, tend to cast the blame on economic ministers, who face an even greater 
probability of removal.65 These risks can incentivize leaders to borrow respon-
sibly and minimize default risk.66 On the other hand, political risks may drive 
leaders of overly indebted nations to temporize, which can exacerbate the eco-
nomic effects of an eventual default.67 For example, an extended period of po-
tential default can create uncertainty, erode confidence, and lead to higher in-
terest rates.68 Notwithstanding the strong incentives for nations to avoid these 
costs, however, defaults have been a recurring theme throughout history.69 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See id. at 18 (noting that the causal nexus between banking crises and sovereign defaults is 
difficult to untangle). 
 62 See id. (observing that “when domestic banks hold large amounts of government debt, the do-
mestic financial sector may be put under significant stress by the default”). 
 63 Id. at 20. 
 64 Id. at 21. When democracies meet their debt obligations, chief executives’ chances of removal 
are less than twenty-five percent. Id. at 22. Default can lead to revolution as well, particularly when 
resulting from a severe economic downturn. Antonis Adam & Konstas Karanatsis, Sovereign Defaults 
and Political Regime Transitions 20–21 (Univ. of Ioannina, MPRA Paper No. 69062, 2016), https://
mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69062/1/MPRA_paper_69062.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6VQ-8BQJ]. For 
example, a sharp contraction in Ecuador’s economy in 1998 and subsequent default in 1999 led to a 
successful coup in 2000. Id. 
 65 Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 49, at 22, 40. These figures suggest that dictatorships may 
need additional disincentives to default. See id. at 22 (finding that dictators typically hold economic 
ministers accountable for default). Economic officials are not safe in democracies, either, as default on 
bonds by any type of government doubles the risk of removal. Id. In normal periods, that risk is 
around twenty percent. Id. 
 66 Id. at 20. 
 67 Id. Failed default-avoidance tactics pose potentially grievous economic risks. Id. Ineffectual 
“belt-tightening” austerity measures can induce or compound economic recession. Id.; see Dickerson, 
supra note 10, at 1006 (noting that “sovereigns . . . often wait too long to initiate a debt restructuring, 
thus increasing . . . the costs associated with the delayed attempt to renegotiate the debt”). The gov-
ernment of Lebanon, which defaulted in March 2020, opted for swift default following an economic 
crisis and has thus far rejected IMF assistance contingent on “austerity measures like tax hikes and 
cuts in subsidies.” Timour Azhari, Lebanon Will Default on Its Debt for the First Time Ever, 
ALJAZEERA (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/lebanon-default-debt-time-200307
182500108.html [https://perma.cc/C4BZ-48T7]. A Lebanese economic analyst called the govern-
ment’s decision the “least worst option available.” Id. 
 68 Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 49, at 20. 
 69 See FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS 
FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 6–9 (2007) (providing detailed historical data on sovereign defaults); see 
also Dickerson, supra note 10, at 1006–07 (noting that sovereigns’ fears of economic repercussions, 
elevated borrowing costs, and uncertainty regarding the success of a restructuring contribute to an 
overall reluctance to default). 
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One reason for the phenomenon’s stubborn persistence is that default be-
gets future default.70 Nations with certain institutional shortcomings appear to 
be more susceptible to default over time, and default itself may have the effect 
of deepening those deficiencies.71 Such “serial defaulters” thus present a per-
petual default risk despite significantly lower GDP-to-debt ratios than more 
developed countries.72 
2. History 
The earliest default on record occurred in Greece in the fourth century.73 
Defaults continued through the centuries, but became more common in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as nation-states and international capital 
markets matured.74 Since the start of the eighteenth century, there have been 
roughly two-hundred and fifty sovereign defaults; of these, Latin American 
governments are responsible for a large majority.75 
Sovereign debt in the twentieth century came primarily in the form of 
syndicate bank loans, which groups of large international banks lent to debtor 
nations.76 Defaulting nations coordinated debt restructurings through deals 
with both the “London Club,” an informal group of commercial lending insti-
tutions, and the “Paris Club,” a group of industrialized creditor nations and 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Reinhart et al., supra note 54, at 1–2. 
 71 Id. Specifically, default-prone countries have underdeveloped financial systems. Id. at 1. De-
fault can impede further development, increasing the risk of future default. Id. Thus, past default is a 
reasonably reliable indicator of future default. Id. at 3. 
 72 Id. at 1. For “debt intolerant” nations, default risk rears its head when their indebtedness 
stretches beyond fifteen to twenty percent of Gross National Product (GNP). Id. Conversely, devel-
oped nations appear capable of carrying debt loads over twice the size of their economic output with-
out an appreciable increase in default risk. See Robin Harding, The Fears About Japan’s Debt Are 
Overblown, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/e26d36e6-918b-11e7-a9e6-11d2f
0ebb7f0 [https://perma.cc/4S8N-JS2J] (discussing Japan’s ability to carry a debt load well over two 
hundred percent of its GDP). 
 73 STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 69, at 3. Greece has defaulted an additional five 
times in the modern era, most recently in 1932. Investopedia, Debt Defaults Have Greek History, 
FORBES (Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2011/09/28/debt-defaults-have-greek-
history/#98bc00f4f2f7 [https://perma.cc/2V2E-84AF]. 
 74 STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 69, at 3–9. Pre-nineteenth century governments 
typically dealt with unsustainable debt burdens through currency debasement instead of formal debt 
restructuring. Id. at 3. 
 75 Usual Suspects, supra note 44. Of the top ten repeat offenders, nine are Latin American coun-
tries. Id. Ecuador and Venezuela lead the pack with ten each, and Uruguay, Costa Rica, Brazil, and 
Chile all have defaulted nine times. Id. Argentina, Peru, and Mexico have each defaulted eight times. 
Id. 
 76 Park & Samples, supra note 32, at 250. 
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lenders such as the World Bank and IMF.77 The latter has reached 433 restruc-
turing agreements since its inception in 1956.78 
In the late 1980s, however, the sovereign debt landscape changed funda-
mentally.79 A tidal wave of defaults dramatically increased borrowing costs for 
Latin American countries, causing a spiral of rising debt service costs, eco-
nomic contraction, and political unrest.80 In response to the crisis, U.S. Treas-
ury Secretary Nicholas Brady introduced a novel solution—conversion of pri-
vately issued sovereign loans into so-called “Brady Bonds” that could be trad-
ed on the secondary market.81 Since then, bond issuance has become emerging 
nations’ favored means of raising capital.82 
Today, government debt has risen to historic heights.83 Since the financial 
crisis of 2008, governments have drastically increased the ratio of their out-
standing debt to GDP in an effort to spur economic growth through spending 
programs.84 Prior to the coronavirus outbreak, outstanding government debt 
had reached seventy-two trillion dollars.85 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Alon Seveg, When Countries Go Bust: Proposals for Debtor and Creditor Resolution, 3 ASPER 
REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 25, 40, 42 (2003). Whereas the Paris Club is a formal entity akin to the 
IMF or World Bank, the London Club simply refers to a rotating cast of syndicated lenders. Id. 
 78 Key Numbers, CLUB DE PARIS, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communications/page/key-
numbers [https://perma.cc/JHG2-W8UQ]. 
 79 Seveg, supra note 77, at 41–42. 
 80 Ross. P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan, FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1802, 1803 (1998); 
Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 49, at 7. 
 81 Buckley, supra note 80, at 1804. “One could say the development of the secondary market 
turned the debt crisis from an unmitigated, into a mitigated, disaster.” Id. at 1889. In the 1980s, poor 
debtor nations borrowed from concentrated groups of commercial lenders. Id. at 1803–04. Although 
this lending paradigm lacked the collective action problems of the Brady Bond system, it tended to 
strangle poor countries’ access to capital. Id. At creditors’ behest, struggling countries enacted austeri-
ty programs to meet debt service payments or qualify for bridge funding; these programs stifled 
growth, making repayment even less likely. Id. Ultimately, some creditors simply stopped lending. Id. 
 82 Id. at 1888; Cuadra & Sapriza, supra note 44, at 3. From 1989 to 1999, outstanding Latin 
American sovereign bond indebtedness grew from one billion dollars to over two hundred billion 
dollars. Cuadra & Sapriza, supra note 44, at 3. 
 83 Spriha Srivastava, Global Debt Surged to a Record $250 Trillion in the First Half of 2019, Led 
by the US and China, CNBC (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/15/global-debt-surged-
to-a-record-250-trillion-in-the-first-half-of-2019-led-by-the-us-and-china.html [https://perma.cc/
JQC4-246G]. In the wake of coronavirus-induced financial panic, “more cases of sovereign and cor-
porate debt distress” await “a world economy awash in debt.” Hung Tran, Coronavirus and Debt: A 
Toxic Mix, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/0cc94fb6-8b35-427d-9f98-dc727
303ebbf [https://perma.cc/LRY7-ZHEP]. 
 84 Mike Bird, Few Warning Signs on Sovereign Debt, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 2018), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/few-warning-signs-on-sovereign-debt-11546007401 [https://perma.cc/YT9L-
MJNP]. 
 85 Tran, supra note 83. This astronomical figure will only increase as governments and central banks 
scramble to stave off recession. See Jason Lemon, National Debt Could Surpass $25 Trillion with Coro-
navirus Spending, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/national-debt-could-
surpass-25-trillion-amid-spending-combat-coronavirus-1493758 [https://perma.cc/FV4W-UL4K] 
(covering the dramatic expansion in U.S. government spending since the outbreak). 
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Emerging markets have increased their indebtedness relative to GDP by 
over forty percent over the past decade.86 Although economists generally be-
lieve that large, industrialized economies can sustain large debt-to-GDP ratios 
without heightening their default risk, less developed countries remain in a 
precarious position.87 Further, surges in public debt are historically correlated 
with a higher incidence of default.88 And as recent history has indicated, sover-
eign default risk can rattle financial markets to their core, potentially posing 
systemic risks to the global financial system.89 
3. Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Brady Bond Era 
Despite mounting indebtedness and the potentially severe costs of default, 
there is currently no clean sovereign restructuring mechanism.90 Moreover, the 
rise of Brady Bonds has led to a wide dispersion of creditors.91 Under the pre-
1980s regime, creditors were few in number and generally aligned in their in-
terests.92 Today, however, sovereign bondholders are scattered across the 
globe; for example, Argentina’s 2001 default implicated nearly half a million 
creditors.93 Diverse creditors may have misaligned incentives following a de-
                                                                                                                           
 86 Ira Iosebashvili, Rising Emerging-Market Debt Sparks Anxiety, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/rising-emerging-market-debt-sparks-anxiety-11546261200 [https://perma.
cc/72J4-PM35]; Jonathan Wheatley, Emerging Markets Under Pressure as Debt Mounts, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c6df7af2-1c9f-11e8-956a-43db76e69936 [https://perma.
cc/SMA4-JS3K]. 
 87 Paul Wallace, $100 Billion of Debt from Emerging-Market Nations Is Now Distressed, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-19/the-emerging-
market-distressed-debt-club-is-getting-very-crowded [https://perma.cc/AK2P-K77X]; see Wheatley, 
supra note 86 (noting that some economists were wary of these rising debt levels prior to the corona-
virus pandemic). 
 88 Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 48, at 1701. 
 89 Roman Kräussl et al., The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: What Have We Learned? 3 (Ctr. 
for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 567, 2017), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/149623/
1/87785405X.pdf [https://perma.cc/FG3K-WXYB]. Economists worry that the so-called “PIIGS,” 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, whose sluggish economies make sustaining their massive 
debt burdens a significant challenge, could “bring down the European Union.” Mark Koba, PIIGS: 
CNBC Explains, CNBC (Aug. 11, 2011), https://www.cnbc.com/id/44058478 [https://perma.cc/V8PP-
EQV3]. The coronavirus has hit Italy particularly hard; an Italian default would pose a “high-impact 
risk to the global economy and an existential threat to the eurozone.” Tran, supra note 83. 
 90 Hagan, supra note 17, at 301–02. 
 91 Park & Samples, supra note 32, at 250. Whereas sovereign creditors were formerly small 
groups of commercial lenders, they now consist of market actors who buy sovereign-issued bonds on 
the secondary market. Id. 
 92 Seveg, supra note 77, at 41–42. Lenders, usually members of the Paris and London Clubs, had 
typically made long-term investments in debtor nations. Id. at 43. Delays in restructuring have injuri-
ous effects on defaulting sovereigns, and hence also on their large creditors. Id. 
 93 Park & Samples, supra note 32, at 251. Adding to the complexity of the situation in Argentina, 
these hundreds of thousands of creditors held 152 flavors of debt securities. Id. These creditors might 
have included “large commercial banks, smaller commercial banks, local banks, investment banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, retail funds, hedge funds, nonfinancial companies, 
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fault.94 This situation has created a chaotic, unpredictable restructuring regime 
that presents several intractable issues.95 
First, absence of a dependable restructuring framework may give rise to 
moral hazard.96 Moral hazard refers to situations in which one party to a trans-
action behaves recklessly because it knows the other party bears the risk of that 
behavior.97 In the sovereign debt context, restructuring distressed bonds owed 
to thousands of dispersed creditors presents obvious logistical difficulties. And 
where the debtor nation is “too big to fail,” institutions like the IMF may ex-
tend bailout loans, which are often contingent on the debtor implementing 
structural economic reforms.98 Such well-intentioned bailout packages, how-
ever, create incentives for debtor nations to ignore both default risk and struc-
tural reform.99 And the dispersion of creditors beyond the debtor nation’s bor-
ders may contribute even further to moral hazard, as the financial health of a 
foreign creditor will likely have little impact on the debtor nation’s economic 
outlook.100 Creditors’ incentives are likewise distorted; IMF backstop loans 
may embolden them to both issue risky loans and oppose restructuring agree-
ments.101 
Second, the Brady Bond era has also created liquidity and informational 
issues on the secondary market for distressed sovereign debt.102 When bond 
prices fall rapidly, creditors who lack the resources to enforce the sovereign 
                                                                                                                           
and retail investors.” Jill. E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures of Vanguards? The Role of Litiga-
tion in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1070 (2004). 
 94 See William W. Bratton, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 4, 20–22 (2004) (explaining the negative effects of the increasing fragmentation of 
sovereign creditors); Fisch & Gentile, supra note 93, at 1074–75 (highlighting the diversity of inter-
ests of sovereign creditors in the Brady bond era). For example, investors may have different invest-
ment horizons and/or cost bases. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 93, at 1075–76. Long-term investors and 
those with relatively low-cost bases may be more willing to grant a sovereign favorable restructuring 
terms. Id. On the other hand, those seeking a quick profit or who bought in at or near face value will 
prefer immediate full repayment. Id. 
 95 Park & Samples, supra note 32, at 252–54. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Moral Hazard, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/1a7ed6da-513d-11df-
aceb-00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/E7D7-FKPK]. 
 98 Wozny, supra note 19, at 717. 
 99 See JOANNA DREGER, COLL. OF EUR., WHY IS SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING A CHAL-
LENGE? THE CASE OF GREECE 7–8 (2012), https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-
paper/beep24.pdf?download=1 [https://perma.cc/B5RW-S2EQ] (discussing how sovereigns expecting 
bailout funds anticipate “a relatively easy restructuring process,” thus “lower[ing] incentives to enact 
reforms necessary to regain the ability to pay its debt”); Dickerson, supra note 10, at 1011 (noting that 
the prospect of IMF backstop funding may lead “sovereigns to make risky borrowing decisions,” and 
that bailouts may protect “sovereigns from the costs of . . . imprudent borrowing”). 
 100 See Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 49, at 17–18 (noting that defaulting nations suffer more 
grievous economic consequences when the majority of their creditors are domestic). 
 101 Dickerson, supra note 10, at 1010. 
 102 Wozny, supra note 19, at 715–17. 
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debtor’s obligations in court may suffer a complete loss on their investment.103 
In addition, creditors may have difficulty gathering information on a debtor 
sovereign’s financial health and borrowing capacity prior to investing, and sov-
ereigns may have incentives to exaggerate economic output in order to reduce 
borrowing costs.104 These issues may reinforce one another, as difficulty in gath-
ering accurate information might reduce the pool of potential investors, thus rais-
ing the risk of total loss for bondholders who cannot litigate their claims.105 This 
in turn contributes to the risk of moral hazard, as default and subsequent total 
loss by creditors represents a windfall to the defaulting sovereign.106 
Third, the Brady Bond era has ushered in severe collective action prob-
lems.107 Thousands of investors with distinct interests, investment horizons, 
and levels of sophistication may hold a distressed sovereign bond.108 In the 
past, coordination between industrialized creditor nations, lending institutions, 
and developing debtor nations was relatively predictable and streamlined, and 
the parties involved generally had an interest in the continued economic 
growth of the sovereign.109 
Although these familiar groups still play a significant role in sovereign 
restructurings, the atomization of creditors has made unanimous agreement 
among them difficult.110 This situation may induce some individual creditors 
who might otherwise agree to participate in a restructuring to “free ride” on the 
efforts of others and await a more lucrative deal.111 In essence, individual cred-
itors have incentives to hold out and sue for full repayment rather than settling 
for a reduced return in a restructuring.112 These holdouts have significant lev-
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. at 711; Felix Salmon, In Defense of Vulture Funds, FELIX SALMON (Feb. 27, 2007), https://
www.felixsalmon.com/2007/02/in-defense-of-vulture-funds/ [https://perma.cc/BG93-V8D4]. 
 104 Park & Samples, supra note 32, at 273. This issue is particularly salient in the context of GDP-
linked equity securities, which some commentators have proposed as an alternative source of capital 
for emerging countries. Id. Several countries, including Argentina, Ukraine, and Greece, have issued 
such securities, although their effectiveness in reducing sovereign debt crises has not yet been deter-
mined. Id. at 273–74. 
 105 Wozny, supra note 19, at 711. 
 106 Id.; see Salmon, supra note 103 (discussing a hypothetical default scenario where there are no 
distressed debt investors). 
 107 Seveg, supra note 77, at 46; see JOHN NOLAN, FIN. POLICY FORUM, EMERGING MARKET 
DEBT & VULTURE HEDGE FUNDS: FREE-RIDERSHIP, LEGAL & MARKET REMEDIES (2001), http://
www.financialpolicy.org/DSCNolan.htm [https://perma.cc/28K6-6FJ3] (offering a detailed overview 
of the collective action issues that have arisen since the implementation of the Brady plan in the 
1980s). 
 108 See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 93, at 1074–76. 
 109 Id. at 1070–73. Dispersion of creditors opens a chasm between creditors’ individual interests 
and the socially optimal outcome of an efficient restructuring. Id. That many creditors are not actually 
lenders and have merely purchased sovereign debt on the secondary market only widens the gap, as 
they lack incentives to provide interim financing. Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 NOLAN, supra note 107. 
 112 Id.; Seveg, supra note 77, at 46–47. 
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erage over the defaulter, as disorderly and protracted restructurings place sig-
nificant economic stress on debtor nations, and holdout litigation itself is ex-
pensive and time-consuming.113 
B. Vulture Funds 
The rogue holdout creditors mentioned in the previous Section are com-
monly referred to as “vultures.”114 The following Section describes the activi-
ties of vulture funds, their history, and their impact on sovereign debt restruc-
turing since the 1980s.115 
1. What Are Vulture Funds? 
American bankruptcy investing came of age in the wake of the Great De-
pression.116 Early distressed debt investors profited through a form of arbitrage 
on the value of companies’ assets and the depressed prices of their securities; 
after restructuring, those prices often converged.117 
The seminal event in modern activist vulture investing was the 1970 
bankruptcy of the Penn Central Railroad.118 At the time, Penn Central’s bank-
ruptcy was one of the largest and most complex in history, involving a tangled 
web of assets, mortgages, and bond issues.119 The fantastic returns earned by 
proto-vultures and the speed with which they generated them induced more 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Wozny, supra note 19, at 716–17; see Alexandra Stevenson, How Argentina Settled a Billion-
Dollar Debt Dispute with Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
04/25/business/dealbook/how-argentina-settled-a-billion-dollar-debt-dispute-with-hedge-funds.html 
[https://perma.cc/YR5S-VGPE] (describing Argentina’s fifteen-year battle with its relentlessly liti-
gious creditors). 
 114 See Katherine Burton & Katia Porzecanski, Vulture Investing, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/vulture-investing [https://perma.cc/N53G-XLK5]. 
 115 See infra notes 116–171 and accompanying text. 
 116 HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS 8 (1st ed. 1990). Still, investing in distressed 
assets is an activity with ancient roots. See 3 PLUTARCH, THE PARALLEL LIVES 318 (Loeb Classical 
Library 1916). Marcus Licinius Crassus, who for a time ruled Rome as triumvir alongside Julius Cae-
sar and Pompey, amassed great wealth by buying burning buildings. Id. at 318, 356. Because Crassus 
obtained these buildings “at a trifling price owing to . . . fear and uncertainty,” he eventually came to 
dominate the Roman real estate market. Id. at 318. Vulture tactics also seem to have been fairly com-
mon in early nineteenth-century America, a period of burgeoning entrepreneurship and concomitant 
business failure. Edward J. Balleisen, Vulture Capitalism in Antebellum America: The 1841 Federal 
Bankruptcy Act and the Exploitation of Financial Distress, 70 BUS. HIST. REV. 473, 474–76 (1996). 
 117 ROSENBERG, supra note 116, at 8; James Chen, Arbitrage, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 1, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arbitrage.asp [https://perma.cc/6BZT-UCRT] (defining arbi-
trage as “the purchase and sale of an asset in order to profit from a difference in the asset’s price be-
tween markets”). 
 118 ROSENBERG, supra note 116, at 11. 
 119 Id. 
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players to get in on the distressed debt action.120 In addition, an overhaul of the 
bankruptcy code in 1978 streamlined the process, allowing companies and 
creditors more maneuverability before and during restructuring.121 The indus-
try has grown exponentially since.122 In 1990, distressed debt funds held less 
than one billion dollars under management; private distressed debt funds today 
hold hundreds of billions.123 
Vulture funds typically buy struggling companies’ debt at a steep discount 
from issue price.124 Traditional, passive distressed debt investors try to identify 
distressed companies with a solid core business or valuable assets; they then 
buy and hold the debt for several years in a bet that the company will return to 
profitability after weathering their present inability to meet debt service pay-
ments.125 These vultures hope to receive the remainder of debt payments, sell the 
debt at a price closer to fair value, or perhaps exchange the debt for equity.126 
Modern vulture funds often take a more activist approach.127 They may 
try to acquire a stake large enough to win some control over the restructuring 
process.128 A one-third share of outstanding debt, for example, is enough to 
block a restructuring agreement, as approval requires a two-thirds super-
majority of creditors.129 Vultures may also try to influence the process by hold-
ing positions on creditors’ committees or leveraging their bankruptcy expertise 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. at 11, 13. Investor Martin Whitman earned a five hundred percent return in just a single 
year. Id. Others with slightly longer investment horizons gained up to ten times the amount of their 
initial outlay. Id. 
 121 Id. at 15. Prior to 1978, bankrupt companies were required to cede management of the compa-
ny to a trustee. Id. Additionally, restructuring agreements needed the unanimous approval of creditors. 
Id. The 1978 changes, which added Chapter 11 to the Bankruptcy Code, allowed management to con-
tinue in their capacity through the bankruptcy and for agreements to pass with approval of just a ma-
jority of creditors. Id. 
 122 See THOMAS DELLA CASA ET AL., MAN INVS., HEDGE FUND INVESTING IN DISTRESSED SECU-
RITIES: CAPTURING THE UNIQUE VALUE CREATED BY CORPORATE AND ECONOMIC TURNAROUNDS 11 
(2008), http://www.opalesque.com/files/ManDistressed_investing_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH2X-
VATW] (describing the explosive growth in distressed debt funds’ assets under management since the 
1990s). 
 123 Id.; Rob Kozlowski, Private Debt AUM Hits $667 Billion in 2017, PENSIONS & INV. (Aug. 6, 
2018), https://www.pionline.com/article/20180806/ONLINE/180809887/private-debt-aum-hits-667-
billion-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/FE4X-NR8X]. 
 124 ROSENBERG, supra note 116, at 22; see Burton & Porzecanski, supra note 114 (providing 
history, definitions, and a concise summary of vulture investor activity in both the corporate and sov-
ereign debt arenas). 
 125 ROSENBERG, supra note 116, at 15, 25–26. Hilary Rosenberg analogizes these vultures to 
“migratory birds” that “fly in” for good opportunities and move on when the weather begins to turn 
cold. Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 15, 25. In contrast to “migratory birds,” Rosenberg likens activist vultures to “nest 
builders; these investors typically have a longer investment horizon and take part in strategic decision 
making.” Id. 
 128 Id. at 19. 
 129 Id. 
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and industry contacts.130 Some vultures may make significant equity invest-
ments in distressed companies as well; these funds may then hire new man-
agement or use their own expertise to guide the company through the restruc-
turing process.131 Others may even use their power as a dominant creditor to 
force the debtor company through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in lieu of informal 
renegotiation with creditors.132 In sum, activist vultures play a significant role 
in determining how a distressed company will accommodate its creditors.133 
Students of the industry have not yet determined whether vultures’ impact 
is a salutary one.134 In certain cases, vultures may hinder efficient restructur-
ing, as bondholders who bought in at different prices have conflicting incen-
tives in a restructuring agreement.135 Nevertheless, vultures play an important 
role in providing liquidity on the secondary market and working capital to dis-
tressed companies.136 In addition, vultures’ incentives are frequently aligned 
with those of the company—each hopes to speed up the restructuring process 
in order to make the company profitable again.137 
2. Sovereign Vulture Funds 
In the 1990s, vulture investors branched out from private debt into sover-
eign liabilities.138 The following Section outlines how vulture funds profit from 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Id. at 19, 27. 
 131 Id. at 19–20, 26. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 22. 
 134 See Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Inves-
tors’ Objectives, 16 ABI L. REV. 69, 70–71 (2008) (declaring that “the precise impact and future im-
plications of the involvement of distressed debt investors . . . are difficult to determine”). 
 135 ROSENBERG, supra note 116, at 20. For example, investors who bought at a steep discount 
may be willing to settle for less than a full return, unlike those who bought in at or near full face val-
ue. Id. 
 136 Harner, supra note 134, at 71; see Paul M. Goldschmidt, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The 
Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 191, 259 (arguing that “distressed debt investors can add new, positive energy to the restruc-
turing process”); see also Edith Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market 
for Control of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 404 (1997) (finding that “post-restructuring 
performance . . . associated with vulture . . . purchases suggest that vultures’ poor public image is not 
justified by empirical evidence”). 
 137 ROSENBERG, supra note 116, at 20. Still, the degree of alignment will depend on the vulture’s 
investment horizon; those who do not care to remain invested in the debtor company until it regains 
financial stability will seek the maximum return on their investment before the debtor is prepared to 
provide it. Harner, supra note 134, at 107. This may in certain cases force potentially viable compa-
nies into liquidation. See id. 
 138 Saskia Sassen, A Short History of Vultures, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 3, 2014), https://foreign
policy.com/2014/08/03/a-short-history-of-vultures/ [https://perma.cc/S69A-BBAQ]. Elliot Associates 
L.P.’s pioneering fifty-seven-million-dollar lawsuit against Panama in New York State court ushered 
in the era of sovereign debt vultures. Id. 
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these investments.139 This Section goes on to discuss vulture funds’ success in 
alleviating the issues of moral hazard, secondary market liquidity and infor-
mation-gathering, and collective action that have plagued the post-Brady Bond 
era.140 
Vultures take a strikingly different approach in the sovereign context than 
they do in corporate restructurings.141 As in the corporate context, vultures buy 
up the debt of distressed sovereigns on the secondary market at bargain pric-
es.142 Instead of working with the sovereign to guide it back to profitability, 
however, vultures seek repayment of principal through litigation.143 Vultures 
typically seek to enforce sovereign debt obligations through the attachment of 
assets, although they have employed other sophisticated strategies in recent 
years.144 These efforts are as controversial as they have been lucrative.145 In 
some instances, vulture suits have sparked international outrage.146 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See infra notes 141–146 and accompanying text. 
 140 See infra notes 147–171 and accompanying text. 
 141 See Sassen, supra note 138 (providing a general overview of how vulture funds profit from 
their investments in distressed sovereign debt). 
 142 Id.; see ROSENBERG, supra note 116, at 22 (discussing vulture funds’ investment tactics in the 
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 143 See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Pan., 975 F. Supp. 332, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
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(reporting on a national anti-vulture fund protest led by students at the University of Puerto Rico). 
1836 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1819 
Vulture funds have a mixed record on the issues that have arisen in the 
lawless post-Brady sovereign restructuring landscape.147 Perhaps the most 
compelling rationale for the continued existence of vulture funds is their deter-
rent effect against sovereign moral hazard.148 Without the looming threat of 
litigation, it is not clear that sovereigns, particularly dictators, have adequate 
incentives to avoid default.149 The economic repercussions from default are 
short-lived, and dictators typically respond to defaults by simply removing 
their economic ministers.150 
Vulture funds also fill a valuable role as providers of liquidity and infor-
mation.151 Where repayment of sovereign debt is uncertain and bondholders 
lack the resources or wherewithal to litigate their claims, vultures may repre-
sent bondholders’ only option for exiting their investment and avoiding a po-
tentially crippling loss.152 In addition, vultures are a reliable source of infor-
mation to investors of all stripes.153 Smaller creditors likely do not have the 
resources to conduct their own research of a sovereign’s financial health prior 
to making an investment, and sovereigns have strong incentives to exaggerate 
economic growth and financial stability.154 After investing, smaller creditors 
have virtually no incentive to gather information, as they are unlikely to be 
able to litigate their claims should the sovereign default.155 Vultures, on the 
other hand, have abundant resources, institutional expertise, and risk total loss 
if their efforts in court do not succeed.156 Vultures’ presence or absence from a 
given market therefore sends a powerful signal to other investors.157 And for 
larger, institutional investors, vulture activity provides crucial pricing infor-
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mation that allows them to mark their holdings to market.158 Vultures have also 
exposed sovereign abuses of international debt-relief efforts.159 
Despite their positive attributes, vultures have undeniably aggravated the 
collective action problems rooted in the atomization of sovereign creditors.160 
Holdout litigation, vultures’ primary tactic in the sovereign context, is a major 
obstacle to an efficient restructuring.161 Because these lawsuits threaten to ex-
tend periods of economic uncertainty, sovereigns have good reasons to settle 
with vultures quickly.162 Other creditors may in turn hold out and seek full re-
payment for themselves.163 Further, a court’s ruling in a vulture suit could alter 
or potentially invalidate the terms of a broader restructuring agreement.164 And 
unlike the creditors of the pre-Brady era, vultures have no interest in the eco-
nomic health of the debtor nation.165 The holdout conundrum also raises the 
risk of moral hazard, as sovereigns facing expensive holdout litigation have 
reduced incentives to implement economic reforms upon which restructuring 
deals are conditioned.166 
These issues are magnified where vulture holdouts are “empty creditors” 
and own credit default swaps on the very debt they seek to enforce.167 Similar to 
insurance contracts, these instruments pay out upon default by the sovereign.168 
In this scenario, vultures have little incentive to engage in restructuring plans 
that will avoid default and therefore fail to trigger payment on the swap.169 
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Finally, vultures may also seek to enforce a sovereign’s “odious” debts, 
funds borrowed nominally for the state but actually diverted to the private use 
of government officials.170 Such odious debts are likewise traded on the sec-
ondary market and are therefore potentially subject to holdout litigation.171 
II. POLICY PROPOSALS 
The evidence suggests that sovereign debt crises are not going away any 
time soon.172 Several international agencies have sounded the warning bell on 
rising levels of emerging market indebtedness, and the coronavirus pandemic 
likely marks the end of the long expansionary period following the Great Re-
cession of 2008.173 To make matters worse for emerging market debtors, the 
U.S. dollar has soared against other currencies in the wake of the outbreak-
induced financial panic.174 Despite this precarious situation, the collective ac-
tion issues associated with securitized Brady Bonds have largely remained un-
addressed since the 1990s.175 
This Part analyzes three of the most prominent policy proposals to rectify 
this glaring market failure; namely, novel contractual provisions, the estab-
lishment of an international bankruptcy regime, and national anti-vulture fund 
legislation.176 The Part provides an overview of each proposal, discusses their 
benefits and drawbacks in light of the issues discussed in Part I, and ultimately 
concludes that none is sufficient to provide the immediate relief that defaulting 
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nations so desperately need.177 This Part then discusses the role of nonprofits 
when neither markets nor governments can offer a solution.178 
A. Contractual Provisions 
Sovereign bond contracts typically contain boilerplate provisions found in 
corporate bonds.179 Beginning in the 1990s, deep-pocketed vulture funds have 
employed crafty litigators to exploit contractual language and enforce payment 
on distressed debt, much to restructuring debtor nations’ detriment.180 Chief 
among these problematic provisions are pari passu and collective action claus-
es.181 
Standard pari passu clauses place bondholders on an equal footing with 
other creditors such as owners of separately issued bonds or commercial syn-
dicate lenders.182 Such a clause might read something like the following: 
“These Notes rank, and will rank, equally (or pari passu) in right of payment 
with all other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External In-
debtedness of the Issuer.”183 
Pari passu clauses in corporate bonds are not controversial—they simply 
preserve the priority of senior debt in bankruptcy and place all unsecured cred-
itors on a level playing field.184 Courts interpreting a pari passu clause narrow-
ly would find breach only where debtors attempt to use legal mechanisms to 
alter the pecking order of creditors.185 In the sovereign context, however, 
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where there is no formal bankruptcy mechanism, the precise meaning of such 
clauses is not so clear.186 
Preying on this ambiguity, enterprising vulture funds have turned this 
rarely used shield into a sharply whetted weapon of destruction.187 In NML 
Capital Ltd. v. Argentina, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted an ex-
pansive interpretation of pari passu.188 Following a controversial 2000 Belgian 
high court decision, the Second Circuit interpreted the clause as restricting 
debtors in default from paying any creditor without making simultaneous pro 
rata payments to all others.189 In essence, the ruling transformed pari passu 
ranking into pari passu payment.190 
The court thus enjoined Argentina’s payments to creditors who had 
agreed to a restructuring plan.191 The Supreme Court’s subsequent denial of 
cert placed the debtor nation in an intolerable bind, as paying vulture holdouts 
in addition to servicing the restructured debt would have thrown it right back 
into default.192 Argentina was therefore forced to settle with the vultures, who 
then used their tremendous leverage to exact a king’s ransom.193 
Sadly, lawyers for sovereign debtors have been unable to articulate a co-
herent alternative account of the pari passu clause in the sovereign context; 
indeed, the original reason for including the clause in sovereign bonds may be 
lost to history.194 And perhaps even more tragically, bonds issued since the ex-
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pansive pari passu interpretation took root have continued to include such 
clauses.195 
Yet another nettlesome boilerplate bond provision is the unanimous action 
clause (UAC).196 Included in most sovereign bonds governed by New York 
law, UACs require all bondholders to ratify changes to bond terms.197 Such 
clauses represent a major obstacle to efficient restructuring; even where ninety-
nine percent of creditors approve of modifications to a repayment schedule, a 
single holdout can steer a sovereign towards default and exact a generous set-
tlement.198 The combination of UACs and pari passu clauses has proven to be 
a deadly cocktail.199 
Fortunately, collective action clauses (CACs), which allow for amend-
ment of bond terms with majority approval, have gradually become stand-
ard.200 In 1996, the G-10 nations endorsed CACs as the best available defense 
against vulture predation.201 Additionally, various official bodies have en-
dorsed novel provisions for inclusion in sovereign bond contracts.202 Perhaps 
most notably, the IMF published formal recommendations in 2014 for best 
practices in bond contract drafting.203 
Although new drafting practices undeniably hold great promise, they 
alone will not protect vulnerable sovereigns in the next wave of defaults.204 
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Some long-term sovereign bonds issued prior to the implementation of drafting 
reforms remain outstanding, and may for some time.205 Further, a majority of 
outstanding sovereign debt is subject to New York state law and includes unan-
imous action clauses.206 And the market’s reluctance to adopt reforms means 
their effect may not be felt for a generation.207 
Moreover, restructuring still promises to be a complex endeavor even 
with pari passu-less collective action clauses.208 Sovereigns issue debt in dif-
ferent series and currencies.209 Vultures can therefore still amass blocking posi-
tions, particularly in smaller issues, which in turn may affect the restructuring 
of other issues.210 
B. International Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy law in the United States has proven remarkably effective at 
preserving the economic viability of debtors while balancing the multifarious 
claims of creditors.211 Indeed, some have credited Chapter 11 with powering 
the United States’ economic engine through periods of turbulence.212 In a typi-
cal business restructuring, an insolvent or barely solvent debtor files for relief 
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under Title 11 of the U.S. Code.213 The court then imposes an “automatic stay” 
on creditors’ right to repayment until the court certifies a debtor-submitted, 
creditor-approved restructuring plan.214 Creditors who do not approve are at a 
minimum entitled to the amount they would receive under a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion.215 The system allows many companies experiencing temporary cash flow 
issues to emerge healthy and profitable.216 
Beginning with Adam Smith in the eighteenth century, reformers have 
been calling for the implementation of such a system for sovereign debtors.217 
In 2001, the IMF put forth perhaps the most detailed proposal in history for an 
international bankruptcy regime.218 Modeled closely after the U.S. bankruptcy 
system, the Sovereign Default Resolution Mechanism (SDRM) sought to im-
pose order on the lawless frontier of sovereign debt restructuring.219 Although 
a majority of IMF Executive Directors supported the SDRM at a preliminary 
stage, the United States, which holds veto power, ultimately torpedoed the 
plan.220 
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Id. 
 218 Hagan, supra note 17, at 300–01. 
 219 Id.; see Park & Samples, supra note 32, at 242 (noting that “sovereign debt markets operate in 
a legal and regulatory void, largely free from direct regulatory or legal authority”). 
 220 Hagan, supra note 17, at 300–01. The United States probably pulled out of the Sovereign De-
fault Resolution Mechanism (SDRM) for several reasons. Id. at 391–92. First, the market had begun 
to adopt the contractual reforms discussed previously in this Part. Id. Next, it appeared unlikely at the 
time that Congress would have approved of the SDRM. Id. The most cynical explanation, and perhaps 
most accurate, is that the financial industry lobbied strenuously against adoption of the proposal. Id. 
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The arguments in favor of an international bankruptcy regime are 
strong.221 A binding, predictable mechanism for restructuring would effectively 
eliminate the collective action issues that have plagued the Brady Bond era.222 
For example, such a system could surmount the difficulties presented by col-
lective action clauses by tallying all creditor votes on restructuring plans, not 
just those on a particular bond issue.223 Moreover, bankruptcy could provide a 
forum for resolution of related disputes and promote greater transparency from 
defaulting debtors.224 
Despite the prospective benefits of an international bankruptcy system, 
however, proposals to date have simply not been able to get off the ground.225 
Reformers have consistently floated the solution since the dawn of the Brady 
Bond.226 Nearly thirty years and billions in vulture fund profits later, there is 
no momentum towards sovereign bankruptcy.227 Although advocates should 
not give up the fight, the grim reality is that defaulting sovereigns need relief 
now.228 
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the best solution to collective action problems). 
 222 Id.; see Dickerson, supra note 10, at 1023–24 (discussing the myriad potential benefits of a 
sovereign bankruptcy system); Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sover-
eign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime 20 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/192, 
2007), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Structuring-and-Restructuring-
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that a “bankruptcy regime for sovereigns could . . . mitigate . . . inefficiency by facilitating debt re-
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 223 Hagan, supra note 17, at 336. 
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28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2018); Hagan, supra note 17, at 336. Whether the DRF’s reach would have 
extended to “non-core” or “related to” proceedings are unclear. 28 U.S.C. § 1334; Hagan, supra note 
17, at 336. 
 225 Dickerson, supra note 10, at 998. 
 226 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2276, 2281 (2000) (surveying sovereign bankruptcy proposals dating from the early 1990s). 
 227 See Dickerson, supra note 10, at 998 (noting that the international community is “unwilling to 
embrace uniform sovereign debt restructuring legislation); Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 161, at 264 
(describing the “fundamental political impediments related to national sovereignty” that have frustrat-
ed attempts to establish an international bankruptcy system). 
 228 See Elaine Moore, International Bankruptcy Law Back on Agenda, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 29, 
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/56622598-59fe-11e4-be86-00144feab7de [https://perma.cc/XQ2E-
Q8XA] (reporting that despite 124 countries voting in the 2014 U.N. General Assembly to consider a 
“legal framework for restructuring the debt of bankruptcy sovereign debt that would go beyond the 
‘market-based’ solution of new bond clauses . . . what comes next is unclear”). 
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C. Anti-Vulture Legislation 
The outrage sparked by vultures’ predatory tactics and the dearth of effec-
tive solutions have led to calls for anti-vulture legislation.229 A handful of 
countries have such legislation on their books, including the United Kingdom 
(UK) and Belgium.230 
The UK passed its anti-vulture law—the Debt Relief Act (DRA)—in 
2010 following a high profile suit in which vultures sought to collect from 
Zambia and Liberia, two of the world’s poorest countries.231 The law’s primary 
mechanism is a cap on sovereign creditor recovery.232 The UK’s law is rather 
limited in scope, however, as it only protects nations that the IMF has desig-
nated as “highly indebted poor countries” (HIPCs), or those who may soon 
qualify.233 In addition, the law applies only to sovereign debt issued prior to the 
DRA’s enactment.234 Jersey and the Isle of Man, both British dependencies 
and noted international financial centers, followed Britain’s lead in 2012 by 
passing virtually identical laws.235 
Belgium’s terse 2015 anti-vulture statute is probably the world’s most 
comprehensive.236 A single page in length, the law includes two main provi-
                                                                                                                           
 229 See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 27/30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/27/30, at 2–3 (Oct. 3, 
2014) (urging member nations to adopt anti-vulture legislation); Stopping Vulture Funds Through 
National Anti-Vulture Laws, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.brettonwoods
project.org/2016/10/stopping-vulture-funds-national-anti-vulture-laws/ [https://perma.cc/8U4W-MGGA] 
(discussing legislative solutions to the vulture fund problem in order to raise awareness). 
 230 Wozny, supra note 19, at 728. Certain of the Channel Islands and Australia have also enacted 
limited anti-vulture laws. Id. 
 231 Muse-Fisher, supra note 192, at 1696. 
 232 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, c. 22, § 3 (UK). 
 233 Id. § 1. The statute applies only to “qualifying debt,” which is defined as: 
[A] debt incurred before commencement that—(a) is public or publicly guaranteed, (b) 
is external, (c) is a debt of a country to which the Initiative [defined as the Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries Initiative of the IMF and World Bank] applies or a potentially el-
igible Initiative country, and (d) in the case of a debt of a country to which the Initiative 
applies, is incurred before decision point is reached in respect of the country. 
Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Wozny, supra note 19, at 731–32. A 2011 vulture lawsuit brought in Jersey against the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo precipitated their passage. Id. The suit purposely sought to skirt Britain’s 
anti-vulture law. Muse-Fisher, supra note 192, at 1697. 
 236 See Loi relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vautours [Law Relating to the Fight 
Against the Activities of Vulture Funds], MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.], [Official Gazette of Belgium], 
Sept. 09, 2015, 57357 [hereinafter Belgium Anti-Vulture Funds Law] (restricting virtually all vulture 
fund activity, regardless of the debtor nation’s wealth); JACQUES RICHELLE, STRELIA, BELGIAN 2015 
ANTI-VULTURE FUNDS LAW 1–3 (2016), https://www.strelia.com/sites/strelia.com/files/strelia_-_
belgian_2015_anti-vulture_funds_law.pdf [https://perma.cc/797S-9U6F] (providing an English-
language overview of the Belgian statute and noting that it remains to be seen whether enforcement of 
the law could conflict with both international treaties and the law of the European Union); see also 
Wozny, supra note 19, at 737–39 (discussing differences between the United Kingdom’s (UK) limited 
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sions.237 First, it forbids creditors from attaching sovereign property, subject to 
some narrow exceptions.238 Next, and most importantly, it eliminates recovery 
for creditors who pursue claims with what the law deems an “illegitimate ad-
vantage.”239 A two-part test determines whether a creditor is indeed pursuing 
such an illegitimate advantage.240 The creditor’s purchase price must first be 
significantly less than either the debt’s face value or the amount the creditor 
seeks in repayment.241 One or more of the following must then apply: the sov-
ereign debtor is insolvent or nearly so; the creditor is incorporated in a qualified 
“tax haven;” the creditor regularly litigates such claims; the creditor held out in a 
restructuring; the creditor seeks to take advantage of the economically vulnera-
ble sovereign; or satisfaction of the creditor’s claims would adversely affect the 
budget and/or economy of the sovereign.242 The Belgian Constitutional Court 
upheld the validity of this sweeping law in June 2018 following a challenge by 
NML Capital, a subsidiary of Elliott Capital Management.243 
Such legislation has not yet found support in the United States, despite 
lawmakers’ attempts in 2008 and 2009 to introduce anti-vulture bills.244 Repre-
sentative Maxine Waters’ “Stop Very Unscrupulous Loan Transfers from Un-
derprivileged Countries to Rich, Exploitive Funds Act” lands somewhere in 
between the relatively narrow DRA and the expansive Belgian law.245 Waters’ 
bill, which was referred to committees but has not yet been subject to vote, 
would effectively bar investment returns on distressed sovereign debt issued by 
poor countries.246 
Anti-vulture fund legislation is an undeniably effective means of reducing 
creditors’ incentives to hold out from restructuring and litigate their claims.247 
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trading). 
 237 Belgium Anti-Vulture Funds Law, supra note 236; Wozny, supra note 19, at 737–39. 
 238 Wozny, supra note 19, at 737. 
 239 Belgium Anti-Vulture Funds Law, supra note 236; Wozny, supra note 19, at 738. 
 240 Belgium Anti-Vulture Funds Law, supra note 236. 
 241 Id.; RICHELLE, supra note 236, at 1. 
 242 RICHELLE, supra note 236, at 1. 
 243 Antonio Gambini & Bodo Ellmers, Debt Justice Prevails at the Belgian Constitutional Court: 
Vulture Funds Law Survives Challenge by NML Capital, CADTM (June 6, 2018), http://www.cadtm.
org/Debt-justice-prevails-at-the-Belgian-Constitutional-Court-Vulture-funds-law [https://perma.cc/
Q73L-8GLD]. The court held the law to be “non-discriminatory, respectful of Belgium’s EU and 
international commitments, and not in violation of any constitutional right.” Id. 
 244 Wozny, supra note 19, at 734. 
 245 See H.R. 2932, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill would prevent “sovereign debt profiteering” 
against “qualified poor countries,” a phrase to be defined by Treasury Department. Id. §§ 3, 6. Unlike 
the Debt Relief Act (DRA), Waters’ bill contains no restrictions related to the timing of bond issu-
ance. See id. (including no language with respect to bond issuance timing). 
 246 Id. Specifically, the law would fine creditors’ returns on poor countries’ sovereign debt pur-
chased at a price less than face value. Id. 
 247 See Wozny, supra note 19, at 731–32 (noting that the DRA had the effect of forcing vultures 
to attempt to litigate claims in UK protectorates such as Jersey). 
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If adopted by a critical mass of developed creditor nations, they could reduce 
collective action issues and enable a more streamlined restructuring process.248 
As only a handful of creditor nations have adopted such laws, however, vulture 
fund activity is alive and well.249 
Still, there are several reasons to be skeptical of such legislation, particu-
larly of a comprehensive law like that of Belgium.250 First, anti-vulture legisla-
tion may significantly erode the secondary market for sovereign debt.251 Bel-
gium’s law, which caps creditor recovery at price paid, effectively extinguishes 
incentives to trade in distressed sovereign bonds, as no rational investor would 
incur transaction costs to acquire an asset that can never appreciate.252 Because 
these laws do nothing to implement structural economic reforms in debtor 
countries, default risk remains.253 Where default risk increases and bond prices 
fall in an illiquid market lacking opportunistic vulture funds, creditors may 
face large losses, or at least be forced into unfavorable restructuring deals.254 
Over time, these risks could chip away at sovereign bond subscription and 
lower developing nations’ access to capital.255 Even under anti-vulture laws 
less draconian than Belgium’s, investors may shy away without adequate in-
formation on sovereign finances, especially considering the incentives for de-
veloping sovereigns to exaggerate their economic output.256 
                                                                                                                           
 248 See Belgium Anti-Vulture Funds Law, supra note 236 (outlawing profitable holdout litiga-
tion). 
 249 See, e.g., Kate Aronoff, Vulture Funds Stand to Make Millions in Wake of Hurricane Maria, 
THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/09/28/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-
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Anti-vulture laws might also exacerbate moral hazard for debtor nations, 
particularly dictatorships prone to incurring “odious” debt.257 Without the loom-
ing threat of litigation to enforce bond claims, sovereigns may be tempted to 
over-borrow, default, and restructure on favorable terms.258 Over time, such be-
haviors are likely to increase borrowing costs, as well as risk of future default.259 
D. Market Failure and Nonprofits 
“Market failure” occurs when market participants’ rational pursuit of self-
interest leads to socially undesirable outcomes.260 One prominent example is a 
market’s inability to limit “negative externalities,” or costs that profit-seeking 
market actors impose upon innocent third parties.261 For example, a factory 
emitting noxious pollutants imposes externalities on its neighbors in the form 
of higher health care costs.262 
Government regulation often acts to mitigate negative externalities.263 In 
the above example, a government might penalize a factory whose emissions 
cause harm.264 But regulatory measures themselves often fail.265 Regulations 
may be ineffective or give rise to unintended consequences, particularly in 
complex markets like the financial or health care markets.266 In addition, regu-
lations themselves impose compliance costs that may exceed the original cost 
                                                                                                                           
 257 Wozny, supra note 19, at 712–14. 
 258 See id. at 709–10 (detailing the problem of moral hazard in the sovereign default context). 
 259 Bai, supra note 255, at 729. 
 260 Jim Chappelow, Market Failure, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/m/marketfailure.asp [https://perma.cc/S8FB-KDFV] (defining “market failure” as a situa-
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 261 Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON., http://
www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/PublicGoodsandExternalities.html [https://perma.cc/NG7T-K3NK]. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility Failure, 
19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1787 (2013). Where externalities cause markets to fail, government 
intervention often takes the form of cost-shifting from innocent third parties to the responsible party. 
Id. at 1793. Such interventions increase economic efficiency, as the externalities no longer affect third 
parties’ behavior. Id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 See HOWARD BEALES ET AL., REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT, GOVERNMENT REGU-
LATION: THE GOOD, THE BAD, & THE UGLY 10 (2017), https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
RTP-Regulatory-Process-Working-Group-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/PCN7-4KHD] (noting that 
although “regulation is an essential tool for achieving broad public goals . . . poorly designed regula-
tions can do more harm than good”). 
 266 See Over-Regulated America, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), https://www.economist.com/
leaders/2012/02/18/over-regulated-america [https://perma.cc/PRZ2-E8SN] (lamenting the inscrutabil-
ity, inefficiency, and dubious efficacy of the Affordable Care and Dodd-Frank Acts). See generally 
DAREN BAKST ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., BIG GOVERNMENT POLICIES THAT HURT THE POOR 
AND HOW TO ADDRESS THEM (2017), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/SR176.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V9MV-MY9G] (exploring the unintended negative consequences of government 
regulation on America’s poorest citizens). 
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of the externality.267 Finally, although regulatory agencies in the United States 
are somewhat insulated from the political process, there is undoubtedly a polit-
ical dimension to government rulemaking; in certain cases, there may simply 
not be sufficient political will to tackle a given problem.268 
Where neither markets nor governments are equipped to solidify a failing 
market, nonprofit organizations often step into the breach.269 Today, there are 
well over one million nonprofits registered in the United States, and it is esti-
mated that their activities constitute five percent of U.S. GDP.270 Data suggests 
that certain nonprofits are highly effective in carrying out their stated mis-
sions.271 The historical record shows that almost all social movements in 
American history spawned from the nonprofit sector.272 
The role of nonprofits in failed healthcare markets furnishes a useful ex-
ample.273 Of the thirty-three wealthiest nations in the world, twenty-four have 
some form of government-provided healthcare.274 In the United States, which 
has not yet ceded control of the healthcare market to the government, nonprof-
its play an essential role.275 Nonprofit hospitals, for example, treat indigent 
patients.276 Were these patients unable to obtain free services on the open mar-
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 270 BRIAN MCKEEVER, URBAN INSTITUTE, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF 2015: PUBLIC CHAR-
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419 (1982) (noting that “in the provision of healthcare, free trade and competition have been particu-
larly ineffective for allocation of resources”). 
 274 List of Countries with Universal Healthcare, TRUE COST (Jan. 21, 2013), https://truecost
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ket, public health would suffer; untreated patients might spread disease, put off 
treatment for early-stage illnesses, or neglect preventative care entirely.277 Any 
of the foregoing outcomes would harm the indigent patient herself, as well as 
create a cascade of costs for other healthcare consumers.278 
The IMF provides a nonprofit corrective to the failure of international 
capital markets.279 By providing intermediate funding to countries in economic 
straits, the IMF works to contain potentially devastating externalities.280 Profit-
seeking actors are unlikely to extend credit to countries on the brink of disas-
ter.281 But these countries badly need access to cash in times of crisis to avoid 
sinking into depression and dragging their neighbors down along with them.282 
The IMF typically makes its loans conditional on the debtor nation implement-
ing structural economic reforms designed to fix the issues that gave rise to the 
crisis in the first place.283 The IMF’s role can be likened to a nonprofit hospital 
treating a patient who is unable to pay; absence of a service-provider of last 
resort would have dire effects for both patients and their neighbors.284 
III. A NONPROFIT VULTURE FUND IS THE BEST AVAILABLE SOLUTION 
The combination of record sovereign debt levels, global recession, and a 
soaring U.S. dollar are a recipe for widespread sovereign default.285 The next 
decade is therefore likely to pose significant solvency challenges for overlever-
aged developing nations.286 
The consequences of sovereign default episodes can be dire, particularly 
when such episodes are protracted.287 The need for the international communi-
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ty to mitigate the damage from such episodes is urgent.288 Aside from the ob-
vious injustice of redirecting wealth from developing nations to hedge funds, 
vulture fund holdout litigation tends to prolong and complicate the sovereign 
restructuring process.289 
Sadly, there is no effective solution at hand to deal with the inevitable 
next wave of defaults.290 Bond drafting norms are powerless to alter the terms 
of most outstanding sovereign debt, and vulture funds have deep enough pock-
ets to obtain blocking positions in individual bond issues and thereby mute the 
efficacy of majority action clauses.291 Although an international bankruptcy 
regime would render these worries moot, the political will to establish one 
does not appear to exist.292 In reaction to public outrage over outsized vulture 
fund returns made at the expense of defenseless sovereigns, some nations have 
enacted laws restricting vulture profiteering.293 But these laws likely go too far 
in eliminating the liquidity, information, and moral hazard check provided by 
vultures.294 Moreover, the long-term effect of such laws on developing nations’ 
access to capital is unclear.295 
Distressed sovereign debt in the Brady Bond era is a classic example of 
market failure.296 Vulture funds’ rational, court-sanctioned pursuit of profit has 
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led to disastrous results for the international community, and neither market-
based nor government solutions are equal to the task of reducing the externali-
ties wrought by holdout litigation.297 
A benevolent, nonprofit distressed debt fund is the best and most readily 
available antidote to pernicious vulture activity.298 In the absence of an effec-
tive market-based solution and enforceable government regulation, a nonprofit 
may be the only one left to fill the void.299 Moreover, such a project is a natural 
fit within the burgeoning socially responsible investing movement.300 
Such a fund is a superior solution to contractual fixes, an international 
bankruptcy system, or anti-vulture legislation.301 First, a well-established in-
ternational body such as the IMF could likely set up such a fund before any 
other available solutions could take effect, particularly since the IMF is already 
engaged in nonprofit, externality-mitigating work in the international capital 
markets.302 Second, although the political will for an international bankruptcy 
regime is lacking, there is likely enough will for a stopgap measure such as a 
nonprofit fund.303 Third, such a fund could at the very least curb vultures’ ex-
cesses while preserving the benefits they provide.304 
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The fund’s charter could be modeled closely after the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement.305 The charter’s “Purposes” section might include a three-pronged 
mission of facilitating efficient sovereign restructurings, pursuing no more than 
modest returns on investment, and providing a check on sovereign moral haz-
ard.306 
The first two prongs would operate in tandem to enable the nonprofit to 
both outbid vultures for bonds at depressed prices and participate cooperative-
ly in restructurings.307 The fund could even buy bonds from vultures on the 
secondary market, allowing vultures to make a quick, if not quite so spectacu-
lar profit while avoiding prolonged litigation.308 It might also consider simply 
subscribing to serial defaulters’ new bond issues.309 
In addition, the fund could offer incentives to market actors who, for ex-
ample, sign a pledge not to engage in holdout litigation; for example, the fund 
might pledge to accept less favorable terms than other creditors.310 By contrib-
uting to a robust secondary market, which sweeping anti-vulture legislation 
would eliminate entirely, a benevolent vulture fund would preserve investors’ 
access to liquidity and information, and by extension sovereign debtors’ access 
to capital.311 
The fund could satisfy the third prong of its mission statement through the 
threat of holdout litigation.312 The fund might first set forth certain “good 
standing” requirements for its debtors; these could include heightened disclo-
sure obligations, debt limits, and structural economic reforms.313 Upon default, 
sovereigns not in good standing would face holdout litigation, and perhaps 
even limits on bailout funds.314 The prospect of litigation might encourage 
sovereigns to implement these reforms in good faith, thereby reducing the risks 
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of moral hazard and serial default.315 The IMF’s Articles of Agreement, which 
include limitations and conditions on its ability to lend, could once again pro-
vide a template for such provisions.316 
CONCLUSION 
Rising sovereign debt levels and global recession will combine to create a 
fertile environment for sovereign default in the decade to come. Since the rise 
of securitized Brady Bonds in the 1990s, holdout litigation by vulture funds 
has delayed restructuring and resulted in massive transfers of wealth from poor 
developing countries to Western hedge funds. Despite spirited debate among 
academics and policymakers, no effective solution to this issue is ready for the 
coming wave of defaults. Proposed solutions will either not take effect quickly 
enough, are not politically viable, or will eliminate the real benefits that vul-
ture funds provide to the secondary market. In the domestic context, nonprofit 
organizations routinely insert themselves into failed markets where market-
based solutions or government regulatory action is ineffective. The community 
of developed nations should therefore form a nonprofit vulture fund to at least 
dampen the impact of vulture funds until a more thorough solution emerges. 
DANIEL J. BRUTTI 
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